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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

17 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: TRANZIT-77 Operational-
Rear Services Command-Staff Exercise

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article outlines and draws conclusions about the organization and methods involved in rear services support to the national armies and individual large units comprising a coalition front during the TRANZIT-77 operational-rear services command-staff exercise. Operations groups were used to play the roles of national support elements in order to bring about better coordination and control. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 15, which was published in 1978.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the [Redacted] Codeword [Redacted].

John H. Stein

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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT



DATE OF INFO. 1978

DATE 17 August 1979

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: TRANZIT-77 Operational-Rear Services Command-Staff Exercise

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by General-Leytenant V. Semennikov and Colonel A. Turovtsev. They outline and draw conclusions about the organization and methods involved in rear services support to the national armies and individual large units comprising a coalition front during the TRANZIT-77 operational-rear services command-staff exercise. Operations groups were used to play the roles of national support elements in order to bring about better coordination and control. The authors indicate that while the rear services large units, units, and facilities of the national armies were basically suitable for their designated tasks, a further effort has to be made to standardize their organizational structure and capabilities for work within the overall system of rear services support of a coalition front. This article appeared in Issue No. 15, which was published in 1978.

End of Summary

Comment:

General Semennikov contributed to an article from the same collection, "From the Experience of the Actions of Rear Services Units and Facilities in the TRANZIT-74 Exercise," Issue No. 8, 1975

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TRANZIT-77 Operational-Rear Services
Command-Staff Exercise

by

General-Leytenant V. SEMENNIKOV

Chief of the Operational Rear Services Directorate
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces
and

Colonel A. TUROVTSEV

A senior officer of the Directorate

The TRANZIT-77 operational-rear services command-staff exercise was held in September 1977 on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Polish People's Republic (PPR). Certain conclusions can be drawn from research carried out in the exercise on a number of matters pertaining to rear services support of coalition troops.

Standard principles of rear services support. The front, which was composed of a number of national armies, conducted an offensive operation during the course of the exercise in cooperation with the air defenses of the countries and the combined fleet, utilizing various systems and types of weapons and combat equipment.

When conducting the part of the operation that was essentially their own, the national groupings of troops received support from their own forces and means taken from national resources while closely cooperating with and providing assistance to one another. For this, they fully deployed the tactical and operational rear services and used the materiel-technical resources which had been established in advance (fixed depots, hospitals, transportation lines, repair facilities).

The employment of national elements in the rear services of the Center was planned for, which permitted each country to carry out the entire array of tasks involved in the rear services support of troops. Under this arrangement, when it became difficult for the allied formations of the National People's Army of the GDR and the Soviet Army that formed part of the front to receive rear services support from the territory of their

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countries, support was implemented through the front rear services.

For example, prior to the accomplishment of the immediate task of the front, the army of the National People's Army of the GDR was fully supported by the national rear services organs. In fulfilling the subsequent task, however, because of the great distance of the forward supply base (of the National People's Army of the GDR), it was supported through a branch of the rear front base of the Polish Armed Forces.

A combined-arms army of the Soviet Armed Forces was supported throughout the operation from the rear front base of the Polish Armed Forces via the forward front base of the Soviet Army that had been transferred to the front.

Individual large units temporarily transferred from one national army to another were supported by the rear services of the armies to which they had been transferred. They were supplied with specific materiel by their own national commands.

The exercise showed that during combined actions, the work of the rear services organs of allied troops must be done centrally on the basis of standard principles and a unified plan of rear services support.

Composition of the rear services. The Polish Armed Forces, on the basis of which the front was deployed, allocated the complement of rear services organs needed for the full support of their own troops. The procedure for rear services support of the combined-arms armies of the National People's Army of the GDR and the Soviet Army that had joined the front was determined, as were the necessary national rear services large units, units, and facilities transferred to reinforce the front -- supply and hospital bases, motor transport and repair units, stationary depots, hospitals, etc. In addition, each army had its own complete complement of rear services units and facilities.

When individual large units were temporarily transferred to other national armies, their rear services were reinforced by delivery motor transport and by separate medical detachments. Increased reserves of specific materiel, especially the types of munitions not available in the particular armies, were

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established in the line units and in depots.

The exercise showed that the organizational structure and capabilities of the rear services large units, units, and facilities of the national armies basically suit their purpose and, on the whole, ensure the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them. Nevertheless, for work within the overall system of rear services support of a coalition front, an effort must be made to bring their organizational structure, equipment, and capabilities into conformity. It is also advisable to work out standard designations and conventional abbreviations of rear services large units, units, and facilities in all the allied armies. All this will considerably facilitate work in organizing and implementing rear services support of troops and will make it possible to improve control of and cooperation among the rear services organs of the allied armies in combined actions.

Materiel support is one of the most important factors involved in maintaining the combat readiness of front troops and their effectiveness to successfully fulfil assigned combat tasks.

As the exercise confirmed, for the uninterrupted supply of troops, it is necessary to establish and maintain in each allied army a certain amount of materiel reserves needed to support the deployment of troops and the conduct of combat actions in forthcoming operations.

The size of tactical and operational (army and front) materiel reserves and of Center reserves is determined by the national commands. They are calculated according to a method which is standard in all the armies.

The materiel requirement for a front offensive operation is calculated as the sum of expenditures for operational deployment, the repulse of an attack, and the offensive, plus the minimum reserves which are to be established by the end of the operation.

The size of the minimum materiel reserves at the end of the operation, together with additional deliveries from the Center, must support the conduct of combat actions in subsequent operations.

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It was confirmed that the expenditure of materiel in accomplishing the front's immediate task was 1.5 times greater than the expenditure which occurred in accomplishing the subsequent task.

For planning materiel support of troops who are in great need of reserves, it is very important to achieve a uniformity of views regarding the echeloning of these reserves. This will permit a coalition front to have standard indices of the supply situation of troops regardless of their national affiliation and to organize materiel support based on a unified plan.

Based on the experience of a number of exercises, it is advisable by the beginning of the initial offensive operation to have at least a 20-day reserve of materiel in the front (of these about 40 percent should be mobile reserves), including a two-day reserve at army bases and a five-day reserve with the troops.

It is also important to provide for the dispersed location of reserves and their reliable shelter from the effects of all types of weapons.

Control of the rear services. The participation in the exercise by rear services control organs of four branches of the armed forces required careful coordination of many matters in order to achieve the goals of the exercises and a uniformity of views on the questions to be worked out. It also gave the directing body and the staffs being trained considerable practice in working out an integrated solution to questions of rear services support of branches of the armed forces in a theater of military operations and in organizing cooperation among them.

We know that control of the rear services is an integral part of troop control. It is based on centralized command of all the main types of rear services support of allied troops by the front command in close cooperation with the control organs of the national armed forces.

Overall command of the rear services is exercised by the commander of the coalition front (fleet). He has full responsibility for rear services support of subordinate formations and large units. His decision for an operation and instructions regarding the rear services are the basis of the

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organization of rear services support of the troops and naval forces. Control of rear services is exercised by him personally via the front (fleet) staff, his deputy for the rear, and the chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services.

Operations groups of combined-arms staffs and staffs of the air defense of the country and of the navy were included in this exercise. This made it possible to work out certain matters involving command of the rear services by the formation commanders (commanders), whose role was performed by the operations groups. It also made it possible to reveal negative aspects in the cooperation between the combined-arms staffs and rear services control organs. The exercise director emphasized in the critique that, judging from the opinions of the exercise participants, this method proved to be correct and we should put it into practice.

Set up under the deputy exercise directors for the national armies were small operations groups which, in addition to carrying out organizational and other tasks, acted as role-playing groups on matters of rear services support, in which they took the place of the central organs of the national ministries of defense. It seems to us that this is a positive phenomenon, since a front operating on the territory of an allied state, as exercise experience has shown, must resolve, in cooperation with the national commands, a very broad range of questions pertaining to materiel-technical, medical, transport, and other types of support.

In our opinion, in order to work out matters of cooperation between the fronts (fleet) and the national commands, it would be useful to include in all major operational combined exercises conducted in a theater of military operations role-playing operations groups of general (main) staffs that are capable of resolving the whole body of essential matters. In this regard, it is desirable to work out in advance a list of matters to be coordinated.

Direct control of the rear services is exercised from the rear control post of formations and large units. In this exercise, the rear control posts of the front and the combined-arms armies had approximately the same organization and deployed similar structural elements on the terrain.

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Operating at the front rear control post were the rear services control center, control posts of the chiefs of services of the rear, and the mobile computer center. Exercise experience shows that to accommodate a front rear control post having a considerable amount of diverse equipment and personnel, it is expedient to select not one, but several suitable areas at short distances from one another and with natural conditions for camouflage and protection against weapons of mass destruction. This applies also for the rear control post of combined-arms and air armies.

Provisional indices with regard to making decisions and planning rear services support. In the first stage of the exercise, the main task of the front and army rear services control organs was to adopt decisions and work out plans for organizing rear services support in accordance with the assigned tasks, which took about 20 hours to do.

An important role in reducing the time for planning rear services support is played by formalized documents which have been prepared in advance, operational-rear services calculations concerning various alternatives, and extensive use of electronic computer equipment. The organization of strict supervision over the timely relaying of rear services directives and instructions to the executors is also very important.

Owing to the special features present in the organizational structure of rear services large units, units, and facilities, in the work methods of rear services control organs, and in the forms and content of operational-rear services documentation adopted in the allied armies, and also because of language differences, certain difficulties arise in exercising control of jointly operating rear services organs and in organizing cooperation among them.

Based on exercise experience, to maintain close cooperation among rear services control organs and to achieve a more rapid and coordinated resolution of matters of rear services support in preparing for and during the operation, representatives were sent from the front rear services to the rear services staffs of the allied armies, and operations groups were sent from the rear services staffs of the allied armies to the front rear services staff with communications means in order to maintain continuous

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
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contact with their own control organs. Besides rear services operations groups, rear services officers from the front and armies were allocated to individual large units forming part of formations of a different national affiliation.

This allocation of operations groups (officers) requires a large number of officer specialists, which can lead to substantial weakening of the rear services control organs of the front (armies). Therefore, we feel it is advisable to have and prepare beforehand during peacetime a special organic contingent of rear services operations groups (officers) with the necessary forces and communications means. ||

These, then, are some conclusions drawn from the experience of this exercise.

Only a portion of the main features of rear services support of allied troops in combined actions has been examined in this article. We hope that the readers of the Information Collection will express their opinions on the problems of further improving rear services support under these conditions.



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